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Abstract
The photon statistics of a quantum key distribution (QKD) source is crucial for security analysis.
In this paper, we propose a practical method, with only a beam splitter and photodetector involved,
to monitor the photon statistics of a QKD source. By implementing in a Plug&Play QKD system,
we show that the method is highly practical. The final secure key rate is 52 bit/s, comparing to
78 bit/s when the source is treated as a trusted source.
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Quantum key distribution (QKD) can establish a secret key between two parties, Alice
and Bob, by a quantum channel and an authenticated classical channel [1]. The uncondi-
tional security of QKD has been proven even when imperfect devices are used [2, 3].
A QKD system is composed of three parts: source, channel and detection. In the GLLP
security analysis [2], the characteristics of these three parts are assumed to be fixed or
measured and known to Alice and Bob. To guarantee the security of a real QKD experiment,
one needs to carefully verify these assumptions.
The decoy state method [5, 6, 7] is proposed to characterize the properties of a QKD
channel. Since a perfect single photon source is currently not available, an imperfect single
photon source, such as a weak coherent state source, is used in real QKD setups. These
imperfect single photon sources may contain some components that are not secure for QKD
use, e.g., multi-photon state. When Alice and Bob are not able to monitor the channel
properties, they have to pessimistically assume that all the losses and errors come from the
single photon components. In this case, the QKD performance is very limited. Fortunately,
with the decoy states, one can estimate the transmission efficiency of the single photon state
accurately and improve the QKD performance dramatically. Note that in the security proof
of decoy state QKD [6], the photon statistics of the source is assumed to be fixed and known
to Alice and Bob. The main objective of the paper is to show how to monitor the photon
source.
For the detection part, the squash model is assumed in the GLLP security analysis. With
the squash model, one can assume that Eve, the eavesdropper, always sends a vacuum or
qubit to Bob. In another word, Bob’s measurement is performed on a vacuum or qubit.
Recently, there are some works done in verifying the squash model [8, 9, 10].
The third part of the QKD system is the source, which is the main concern of this
paper. Here, we consider the case that Eve has a full control of the photon source. That
is, the source is untrusted. This is a crucial assumption in the security proof of some QKD
schemes, such as the Plug&Play system [11]. Recently, the QKD with untrusted source is
studied [12, 13]. By random sampling the photon source, the security is proved even when
Eve controls the photon source [12]. This random sampling process requires a fast random
switch and a perfect “intensity monitor”. However, in reality, this is not practical.
In this paper, we replace the random switch with a passive beam splitter. An inefficient
intensity monitor is used, which is modeled by a virtual beam splitter and an ideal detector.
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The schematic diagram of the setup for Alice to monitor the photon source is shown in
Fig. 1. In the following discussion, Pi with i = 1, · · · , 6, refers to position i in Fig. 1.
FIG. 1: A schematic diagram of the setup on Alice’s side. The untrusted photon source, prepared
at P1 by Eve, passes through a low-bandwidth filter and a phase randomizer (PR). Then a beam
splitter (BS) (transmission: tbs) is used to separate it into two beams, 3 and 4. One beam goes
to a photodetector (detection efficiency: tD) at P3 and the other is prepared for QKD at P4. An
attenuator (Att) between P4 and P5 has the attenuation coefficient ηs (ηd) for the signal (decoy)
state. Two polarization beam splitters (PBS1 and PBS2) and a phase modulator (ΦA) between
P5 and P6 are used for phase encoding.
The experimental procedure goes as follows.
(i) First, the untrusted photon source passes through a filter, which guarantees the state
in single mode at P2. Then the global phase of the state is randomized by a phase
randomizer (PR in Fig. 1). Thus, the state at P2 can be expressed as [6]
ρ2 =
∞∑
N=0
Pt(N)|N〉〈N |, (1)
where Pt(N) satisfies
∑
∞
N=0 Pt(N) = 1 and |N〉 is the number state.
(ii) A small part (1− tbs) of the beam at P2 will be reflected by the beam splitter (BS) to
P4, and the rest of the beam will be transmitted to an inefficient photodetector at P3.
The inefficient detector can be treated as another virtual beam splitter (transmission:
tD) placed in front of an ideal detector. Thus, the photoelectron distribution D(m)
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measured at P3 is the Bernoulli transformation of the photon distribution Pt(N) at
P2. On the other hand, Pt(N) can be inferred by the inverse Bernoulli transformation
of D(m) [14]
D(m) = B[Pt(N), ξ] =
∞∑
N=m
Pt(N)
(
N
m
)
ξm(1− ξ)N−m,
Pt(N) = B
−1[D(m), ξ−1] =
∞∑
m=N
D(m)
(
m
N
)
ξ−N(1− ξ−1)m−N ,
(2)
where ξ = tbstD. When ξ > 0.5, the Pt(N) distribution can be efficiently recovered
from D(m) [15, 16].
(iii) From P2 to P4 and P4 to P5, the state will be changed by the BS and an attenuator
(Att in Fig. 1) with an attenuation coefficient 1− tbs and ηs (ηd) for signal state (decoy
state), respectively. Thus, at P5, the photon number distribution Ps(i) for the signal
state is B[Pt(N), η
′
s] (see Eq. (2)) and Pd(i) = B[Pt(N), η
′
d] for the decoy state, where
η′s = ηs(1− tbs) and η
′
d = ηd(1− tbs).
D(m) can be measured directly from the experiment. Then Pt(N) can be calculated by
Eq. (2). From Pt(N), we can bound N ∈ [Nmin, Nmax] with a confidence (1− ε). Following
[12], one can lower bound the gain Qs1 (Q
s
1) and upper bound the error rate e
s
1 (e
s
1) of the
single photon state. The secure key rate can be written as [2, 12]
R = q
[
−Qsf(Es)H2(Es) + (1− ε)Q
s
1(1−H2(e
s
1))
]
, (3)
where q is the basic reconciliation factor, Qs and Es are the overall gain and error rate of
the signal state, f(Es)H2(Es) is the leakage information in the error correction (normally,
f(Es) ≥ 1), and H2(x) = −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x) is the binary entropy function.
As shown in Fig. 2, we implement the aforementioned scheme in a standard Plug&Play
QKD system. For applying the weak+vacuum decoy protocol, the experimental parameters
are listed in Table I. The average photon numbers for the signal state and weak decoy
state are µ and ν, respectively. Nµ, Nν and N0 are the pulse numbers for the signal, weak
decoy and vacuum states, respectively. Note that 50 laser pulses are set as a pulse train
whose period is 350 µs. In Eq. (3), one can use q = 0.5F · Nµ/(Nµ + Nν + N0), where
F = 50pulses/350µs is determined by the burst mode of laser source. The temperature of
laser diode is well-controlled for decreasing intensity fluctuations.
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FIG. 2: Experimental setup for QKD system. A gain-switched distributed feedback (DFB) laser
diode emits a pulse train of laser pulses [center wavelength: 1546.1 nm, pulse duration: 300 ps, pulse
repetition rate: 1 MHz] which are polarized by the polarization maintaining (PM) fiber’s slow axis.
The circulator and 50/50 coupler (C1) are polarization maintained. SPD1, SPD2: single photon
detector; PBC/PBS: polarization beam combiner/splitter; PMA, PMB: phase modulator; DL: PM
fiber; LAB: 25 km single-mode fiber; SL: 5 km storage line; VOA: variable optical attenuator. A
900 Faraday rotator (FR), together with the PBS, plays the same role as a Faraday mirror. To im-
plement the aforementioned scheme shown in Fig. 1, we use a filter (transparency window: 0.8 nm),
phase randomizer (PR), 95/5 beam splitter (BS) and pin photodetector (detection efficiency tD:
0.8).
µ ν ξ Nµ Nν N0 η
′
s η
′
d ηB
0.48 0.06 0.76 61747531 23056601 5712393 2.5× 10−8 3.1× 10−9 0.04
TABLE I: The experimental parameters. ηB is the efficiency of Bob’s detection system.
To implement the scheme shown in Fig. 1, we use a beam splitter (BS) with tbs = 0.95
transmitting 95% of the laser beam to a pin photodiode. In total, ξ = tbstD = 0.76 of the
incoming photon source is monitored by the photodiode. In the detection, an integrating
capacitor is charged by the emitted photoelectrons and its voltage is proportional to the
number of photoelectrons. The voltage signal is amplified, sent to a sampling oscilloscope
(Tektronix MSO4104) and recorded. Before next photoelectron pulse arrives, due to the
charge leakage, the capacitor is discharged. D(m) is experimentally measured and shown in
Fig. 3.
The experimental data are shown in Table II. 〈m〉 and 〈∆m2〉 are the average number
and variance of photoelectrons m, respectively. From Eq. (2), one can derive that 〈N〉 =
1.914 × 107 and 〈∆N2〉 = 1.063 × 1011 for Pt(N), in fact, 〈m〉 = ξ〈N〉 and 〈∆m
2〉 =
ξ(1 − ξ)〈N〉 + ξ2〈∆N2〉. Fig. 3 shows that D(m) can be well fit as it is derived from the
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The photoelectron probability distribution D(m) with the experimental
data shown as bars. The full curve represents the theoretical fit given that Pt(N) is Gaussian
distribution.
Bernoulli transformation of a Gaussian distribution of Pt(N).
Qs Qd Q0 Es E0 〈m〉 〈∆m
2〉
5.84 × 10−3 7.48 × 10−4 9.38 × 10−5 2.1% 46.1% 1.455 × 107 6.14 × 1010
TABLE II: The experimental results.
In the postprocessing, an improved “Cascade” protocol [17] is applied for the error cor-
rection and f(Es) is estimated as 1.06 in Eq. (3). Based on the Gaussian distribution of
Pt(N), N ∈ [Nmin, Nmax] with the confidence (1− ε) are chosen as [1.751× 10
7, 2.077× 107]
and (1 − 5.7 × 10−7), respectively. Then follow the analysis proposed in Ref. [12], Qs1 and
es1 are 2.58× 10
−3 and 3.77%, and the secure key rate can be calculated as R ≥ 52 bit/s by
Eq. (3). Note that with the same setup, the secure key rate is estimated as R ≥ 78 bit/s if
the source is trusted.
We have following remarks:
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1. Due to the computational complexity of the inverse Bernoulli transformation, see
Eq. (2), we simply assume that Pt(N) follows the Gaussian distribution. As shown in
Fig. 3, we deduce D(m) from Pt(N) and fit with experimental data. Note that how
to calculate Eq. (2) in postprocessing efficiently is an interesting future topic.
2. In the experiment, the electronic noise can be deducted from the signal to enhance the
estimation ofD(m). We use an oscilloscope to acquire data from the pin photodetector.
The data transmission speed of the oscilloscope limits the speed of photon source
monitoring. In the future, a high speed analog-to-digital circuit can be designed to
replace the oscilloscope.
3. In the analysis, we assume that the photon source is single-mode after passing through
an ideal filter. In the real experiment, the bandwidth of filter is not perfect. Thus, it
is interesting to investigate how to analyze a multi-mode photon source for QKD in
future.
4. Note that the statistical fluctuations from the finite data size [18, 19] and the accu-
racy of the estimation of D(m) are not considered in our security analysis, which are
encouraged to be investigated in future.
In conclusion, a practical method to monitor the photon statistics of QKD source is
proposed and is implemented in a real-life Plug&Play QKD system. We run the experiment
around 20 minutes. The final secure key rate is 52 bit/s, comparing to 78 bit/s when the
source is treated as a trusted source.
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